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E D I T O R I A L C O MM E N TA R Y
Eradication of Poliovirus: Fighting Fire With Fire
Neal Nathanson
Global Health Programs, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
(See the article by Wasssilak et al., on pages 898–909.)
Endemic wild polioviruses have been
eliminated from most of the world, and
the number of human paralytic cases has
been reduced by .99%, from an esti-
mated annual incidence of .500,000
cases to ,2000 cases [1–3]. Circulating
wild polioviruses remain endemic in
only 2 major locations, Nigeria and
a zone extending from northern India
west to Pakistan and Afghanistan [1–3].
Furthermore, wild-type 2 poliovirus has
been eliminated altogether, with the last
documented case reported in northern
India in 1999 [4]. These remarkable ac-
complishments represent a triumph for
oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), com-
posed of attenuated variants of the 3
poliovirus serotypes [5]. OPV is ad-
ministered by mouth, induces mucosal
and humoral immunity, and is relatively
inexpensive to produce—attributes that
have contributed to its widespread use
even in regions with rudimentary health
systems.
However, OPV has an Achilles heel.
The attenuated variants in the vaccine
are rapidly replaced by revertant mu-
tants, even on a single passage through
the human intestine [6]. The revertant
genotype has been mapped to a limited
number of point mutations [7, 8], and
revertant viruses can be distinguished
genetically from wild polioviruses [8].
OPV vaccinees excrete a mix of viruses,
some of which are as paralytogenic as
wild polioviruses. These excreted viruses,
similar to wild polioviruses, are readily
transmitted to contacts of vaccinated
infants and children by the fecal-oral
route. Therefore, after mass OPV vacci-
nation campaigns, the environment is
inundated with a mix of excreted vi-
ruses, some of which have the disease
potential of wild polioviruses. Therefore,
the use of OPV could be considered to
be an example of fighting fire with fire.
The dangers of OPV were recognized
during early vaccine trials, and one epi-
demiologist coined the epigram ‘‘in like
a lamb out like a lion’’ [9 p. 1214]. On
the basis of meticulous surveillance in
the United States, vaccine-associated
paralytic poliomyelitis was documented
both in vaccinees and their immediate
contacts [10–14]. However, vaccine-as-
sociated paralytic poliomyelitis in con-
tacts was rare and sporadic, occurring at
a rate of 1–2 cases per 1,000,000 primary
vaccinations. In retrospect, it is likely
that vaccine-derived polioviruses
(VDPV) did not spread widely in the
United States because most susceptible
children were vaccinated with OPV,
rendering them resistant to virus shed by
their vaccinated contacts.
Since 2000, .15 outbreaks of para-
lytic poliomyelitis caused by circulating
VDPV (cVDPV) have been recognized
throughout the world [1]. Such out-
breaks have shared one epidemiological
characteristic. They have occurred in
areas where OPV vaccination coverage
has been incomplete; thus, .50% of
children remained susceptible. Under
these circumstances, cVDPV can circu-
late for many generations, infect large
numbers of persons, and cause out-
breaks of paralytic poliomyelitis.
The article by Wassilak et al [15] in
this issue of the Journal and a compan-
ion article [16] describe the most sig-
nificant of these outbreaks of cVDPV.
The Nigerian epidemic, in which type 2
VDPV has caused .300 paralytic cases,
began in 2005 and has continued
through 2010. Because wild-type 2 po-
liovirus causes only 1 paralytic case per
2000 infections [1], the Nigerian out-
break might represent .600,000 in-
fections with virulent VDPV.
Under what circumstances did this
outbreak occur? First, similar to other
outbreaks of cVDPV, the epidemic was
concentrated in the northern region of
Nigeria, where there were relatively low
rates of OPV vaccination [15]. Second,
during 2006–2010, most of the vaccina-
tion campaigns in Nigeria used either
monovalent or, more recently, bivalent
vaccine lacking type 2 OPV. The
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decision to use these formulations was
based on an attempt to control wild-type
1 and 3 polioviruses at a time when
wild-type 2 had been eliminated.
Monovalent and bivalent formulations
that omit type 2 OPV are much more
effective than is trivalent OPV [17, 18].
In 2009, the dramatic increase in cases
due to type 2 cVDPV led to several
rounds of trivalent OPV, which may
account for the rapid decrease in the
number of type 2 cases in 2010. How-
ever, this outbreak has not yet been
terminated, posing the potential threat
of re-introduction of virulent type 2
polioviruses. Because wild-type 1 and 3
polioviruses frequently spread from
Nigeria to neighboring countries in
Africa, this constitutes a significant
contingency [19].
The occurrence of repeated outbreaks
of cVDPV and the magnitude of the
Nigerian epidemic have sent a clear
message. True eradication can only be
achieved with the elimination of all cir-
culating polioviruses. In countries or
continents where wild polioviruses have
been eliminated, there should be a tran-
sition from OPV to inactivated poliovi-
rus vaccine. Many industrialized
countries have already made this shift,
which occurred in the United States
during 1998–2000 [14]. Although there
is no universal consensus, a number of
experts have advocated this strategy [20–
27]. Because inactivated poliovirus vac-
cine is expensive to manufacture and
must be injected, this approach is costly.
Several donors (including Rotary In-
ternational and the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation) have made signifi-
cant commitments to underwrite this
campaign for low-income countries.
Although recent history compels
caution, it appears that the world may be
on the cusp of elimination of indigenous
wild polioviruses. When this goal is
achieved, it will then be necessary to
terminate the use of OPV if true eradi-
cation of circulating polioviruses is to be
accomplished.
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